Battle of Kosovo 1389: Chosen Trauma as Manipulator and Mobilizer

When looking at the legacy of the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s, primordial and “ancient hatreds” arguments are theories of the past. Instead, the real answer resides under constructivist and instrumentalist explanations for ethnic conflict: Serbian elites manipulated the Serb population in order to engineer fervent nationalism and war. Elites utilized Serbs’ chosen trauma of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and threat narratives to trigger a security dilemma.

Volkan’s theory of chosen trauma is one of the most relevant theories to apply to Serbs in the Balkan region. Volkan presents the idea that identity groups harness an event from the past and perennially mourn over it; a particular group will refer to an event that happened long ago as if it happened in their lifetime (Volkan, 1997). For Serbs, one of their most significant chosen traumas is the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, which “provided fuel for the fire” of potential conflict (Volkan, 1997). To Serbs, this battle is the epitome of Serb victimization by the Ottomans, and by extension, any Muslims or outside interlopers.

In the late 1990s, Slobodan Milošević utilized the Battle of Kosovo to mobilize Serbs and create a nationalistic fervor. The chosen trauma lay dormant in Yugoslavia during Tito’s reign (although did not die completely); Milošević used media, a rousing speech at the site of the battle on its anniversary, and a tour of the body of Prince Lazar (leader of Serbia killed during the battle) to reignite the Serb devastation over an event six hundred years in their identity’s history (Volkan, 1997). Whereas in the past, intermarriages and lifelong friendships illustrated the ethnic cooperation that had existed in the region, the Serb population was swayed by elite manipulation, highlighting the dynamic nature of identity and its constructed nature.

By parading the body of Prince Lazar, a revered figure in Serbian history, Milošević was utilizing Turner’s theory of the prototype. A prototype is the subjective representation of a social category; the prototype represents the stereotypical example of a person with that identity. With a prevalent oral storytelling tradition, Serbs handed down the story of Prince Lazar via song and tale; Volkan finds that this is arguably the most important historical event in Serb history (Volkan, 1997). Therefore, Prince Lazar was a prototype long before Milošević began to use his name in speeches. Serb attachment to Lazar helps to explain why Milošević was so successful in mobilizing Serbs against Bosniaks as well as Croats.

Volkan argues “Bosnian Muslims…served as a reservoir for the massive projections of Serbs’ unwanted qualities” (Volkan, 1997). This incorporates two more of Volkan’s theories: shared reservoirs and projection. Reservoirs can be objects or events, which contain the essence of a group’s “we-ness” and connect personal identity to group identity (Volkan, 1997).  Bosniaks are a living, everyday reminder of the Serb defeat at the Battle of Kosovo. Projection, according to Volkan, is a method to deal with unsavory aspects of one’s identity. Volkan argues that one such projection for Serbs is aggression, which they project onto the ‘other,’ Bosniaks (Volkan, 1997).

If Bosniaks serve as reservoirs for the Battle of Kosovo, Croats serve as reservoirs for another chosen trauma in Serb history, World War II. Croat Ustaša sent Serbs to Nazi-like death camps, and Serbs were the identity group with the most overwhelming losses. In fact, as tensions increased Volkan’s idea of minor differences arose between Serbs and Croats (Volkan, 1997). These minor differences shape the boundary; otherwise looking too similar to another group prevents the ability to project (Volkan, 1997). Although differing along religious lines, there is little separating the two groups. However, minor differences over written language (Latin alphabet in Croatia, Cyrillic in Serbia) and pronunciation of certain words were elevated to make the same language seem drastically different. This serves as one explanation for why Serbs were mobilized against both Bosniaks and Croats.

Invoking chosen traumas, the prototype, and minor differences all contributed to a growing threat narrative about a Muslim incursion into Serb land (Korostelina and Rothbart, 2006). This also represented an unbalanced collective axiology: “they” (the Muslims) were going to strike at any moment in the minds of Serbs. The differences between the groups in the threat narrative were developed by the chosen trauma of the Battle of Kosovo. As the likelihood a threat became real to Serbs, they entered into a perceived security dilemma. The Serbs thought that it was “we” or the Muslims and they had to be prepared to strike first.

Horowitz synthesizes ten explanations for the occurrence of ethnic conflict and presents his case for which of the ideas work in practice. It was originally thought that the conflict in the Balkans was an ethnic war; that is, primordialism, ancient hatred, or a clash of civilizations made conflict inevitable in the region (Horowitz, 1998). In his explanations, I find the idea of “elite entrepreneurs” (or instrumentalism) most appropriate to explain this conflict (Horowitz, 1998). He argues that this explanation removes agency from the population that appears easily swayed by these elites. However, the elites in this case, like Milošević, used a plethora of tools to ensure mobilization of Serbs, particularly a chosen trauma and threat narrative that spiraled into a security dilemma.

Similarly, Eriksen details the two arguments in ethnic-based conflict studies: primordialism vs. instrumentalism and constructivism vs. essentialism (Eriksen, 2001). He finds, and I agree, that primordialism and essentialism are defunct explanations. The conflict that occurred between Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks in the early 1990s can be explained with constructivism and instrumentalism: constructivism, in that the Serb identity was fluid and flexible, and open to manipulation; and instrumentalism explains the method used by the elite entrepreneurs to boost nationalism and mobilize the Serbs for war.

In conclusion, the Serb population of the Balkans was mobilized for war due to the constructed nature of identity in the region (constructivism) and the manipulation of elites for political ends (instrumentalism). These elites, like Milošević, harnessed the power of the chosen trauma of the Battle of Kosovo, the prototype of Prince Lazar, and minor differences to heighten Serb nationalism. These all contributed to a growing threat narrative, which involved Bosniaks in a perceived security dilemma with the Serbs.

Sources

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. “Ethnic Identity, National Identity, and Intergroup Conflict: The Significance of Personal Experiences.” In Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction, by Richard D Ashmore and Lee Jussim and David Wilder, 42-68. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Horowitz, Donald L. “Structure and Strategy in Ethnic Conflict.” Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics. Washington, 1998. 1-36.

Korostelina, Karina V. “Theories of Social Identity.” Lecture, Identity and Conflict, September 16, 2013.

Korostelina, Karina V. “Collective Axiology.” Lecture, Identity and Conflict, October 21, 2013.

Rothbart, Daniel and Karina V. Korostelina. Identity, Morality, and Threat. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006.

Volkan, Vamik. Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.

Chosen Trauma in the Boston Bombing Case

Chosen traumas are perpetuated by generational narratives. Stories of suffering from hundreds of years in the past psychologically traumatize members of a particular identity group, even though they have no direct connection to the events.

All too often, we turn on the news to find unexpected horrors waiting for our attention, each engulfing the twenty-four hours news cycle before quietly slipping back into our locked away memories. It is when these events fail to retreat into the recesses of our minds that real trauma has occurred. And the particular trauma that occurs after events like the Boston bombings is a largely Western phenomenon, where the “that sort of thing doesn’t happen here” mentality is shattered by horrific violence all too familiar in other parts of the world.

Vamik Volkan uses psychoanalytic theory to explain his belief in the idea of chosen trauma. He writes that, not only do we mourn the loss of a loved one, “we also mourn the loss of persons and things that we hate, since like love, hate connects us deeply to one another” (Volkan, 1997). This is reminiscent of many discussions I had with fellow students in the aftermath of the bombings: disbelief and horror quickly turned into national and global solidarity. The world agreed that the perpetrators were individuals worthy of hate. However, there was also talk of the bravery of people on the scene and the first responders; faces from around the world took pictures with signs to show their support for the Boston victims. At S-CAR we asked, how can this type of mass American solidarity (similar but not quite as potent as the rally around the flag experienced post-9/11) be extended past the wake of atrocity? Unfortunately and sooner rather than later, the solidarity fades and the world collapses back into fragments.

Chosen Trauma

Volkan argues that some tragedies experienced on the societal level do not go through a typical group mourning process. Sometimes, “a shared calamity can leave members of a group dazed, helpless, and too afraid, humiliated, and angry to complete or even initiate a mourning process…group members cannot turn their passive submission to the event into responsive, constructive activities” (Volkan, 1997).

These calamities can be caused by an event that is incited by a neighboring enemy. The closeness to the enemy will instill a feeling of humiliation in the aftermath of the trauma, often resulting in some form of PTSD. The PTSD creates an “internalized version of a trauma [that] remains in the minds of the victims long after the overwhelming physical danger disappears” (Volkan, 1997). A shared “mental representation” of the event will envelop an entire group ethnic identity.

Volkan uses the term “chosen trauma” to refer to groups who suffer from the collective memory of a calamity that occurred to their group in a shared past history. How did chosen trauma inspire, navigate, and assist the Boston bombings perpetrators?

In order to understand the mechanics of chosen trauma, we must look to the cultural background of Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. The brothers are Chechen, and originally lived in the country.  Like most chosen traumas, the Chechen trauma has its origins hundreds of years in the past. Narratives, passed down generation to generation, tell a tale of feared Russian domination. It is said that Chechens initially converted to Islam as a way to ingratiate themselves with the Ottoman Empire and shore up an ally against the Russians (Tribune, 2013).

Since the dissolution of the USSR, Chechnya has suffered through nearly two decades of conflict, stemming from a failed separatist movement. The first war lasted between 1994 and 1996, and all parties tabled a statehood discussion for five years following a cease-fire agreement in 1996. In these interim five years, the Chechens sought international recognition to maintain the aura of independence (Lynch, 2004). The interim also marked a growing Islamic radicalization among many of the separatist fighters.

In 1999, the conflict briefing resumed, this time with a high concentration of radical Islamist guerilla fighters in command, which unlike the first war (by all accounts secular), turned the conflict into a quasi-religious one (Tribune, 2013). The Russian Federation used armed force to quash the Chechen de facto self-declared Republic of Ichkeria in 1999 (Lynch, 2004). Dov Lynch argues that Putin has “masked the policy of eliminating the separatist threat by characterizing Russia’s actions as part of the struggle against international terrorism” (Lynch, 2004). This has effectively labeled any argument of Chechen sovereignty as illegitimate, and the Russians continue to eliminate any perceived manifestations of Chechen plays for autonomy (Lynch, 2004). However, the conflict did not end with the dissolution of the de facto state.

The Chechens also took to terrorist activity outside of the war zone, in a Moscow theater and a southern Russia elementary school. Fighters in Chechnya increasingly became identified as martyrs if they died in battle. The Chechen fighters “reveled in telling stories of terrific battlefield heroism drenched in the language of martyrdom” (Tribune, 2013). These stories, or as Volkan might call them, “chosen glories,”  helped to recruit fighters from all across the Caucasus and other Muslim countries. The region was not immune to violence either, with attacks and killings in places like Dagestan and Ingushetia (Tribune, 2013). Currently, Chechens remain highly hostile towards Russia. Radical Islamists continue to gain traction and is entirely entrenched in the region (Tribune, 2013). An active state of war remained from September 1999 to 2009. Reportedly, both Tsarnaev brothers fled Chechnya with their family during the violence of the first Chechen war (Tribune, 2013).

Most likely, a “transgenerational transmission” occurred: a member of the older generation, who directly experienced the conflict, “unconsciously externalize[d] his traumatized self onto” the Tsarnaevs’ developing personalities as children (Volkan, 1997). Per age and various sources, it is likely that the older brother, Tamerlan, falls into the category of receiving a transgenerational transmission. As Volkan explains, in transgenerational transmissions, “patterns of behavior and nonverbal messages are intuited and acted upon accordingly…the transmitted psychological DNA affects both individual identity and later adult behavior” (Volkan, 1997).

As the unconscious receiver of these feelings, and because the older generation has influence on the younger, Tamerlan probably absorbed “their wishes and expectations” which manifested in his desire to perform a jihadist mission. The process likely started during the first Chechen war, as Tamerlan was old enough to overhear what his elders thought about Russia and maybe even the international community. He was also likely exposed to the growing vein of radical Islam from Chechen friends and relatives.

It seems within the realm of possibility to speculate that Tamerlan held considerable sway over his younger brother, Dzhokhar. With an absent father (and mother), the older brother became the surrogate father to the younger brother, making it easier for Tamerlan’s to transmit his radical views to Dzhokhar. Dzhokhar, at a much more formative age, found what he perceived to be lacking in his own identity within his brother’s ideology – and acceptance by his brother.

Conclusions

In my introduction, I questioned whether global solidarity can be maintained after the initial wave of positivity. How can we engender these feelings without the necessary spark of violence?

Think about the opening ceremony of the Olympics, with each participating country’s athletes proudly marching behind their flags. It is such a fleeting moment in time, where for a few short hours, the world celebrated together around the shared commonality of sport. How can we, bottle that feeling, that moment in time? I think it’s a pertinent and valuable question to ask ourselves as we try to find solutions to combat such heinous and unexpected attacks, at home and abroad.

Burton writes that “it could be that societies are endeavoring to guide and control behavior by means and along lines that cannot succeed, towards goals that are behaviourally irrelevant….herein lies the irrelevance and invalidity of traditional coercion theories and the notions of integrated societies” (Burton, 1979). In this passage I find both means to despair and hope. If our societies are fundamentally incapable of satisfying all basic human needs, then attacks like the one in Boston will continue to occur. But if we can recognize that the system is flawed, then there is a chance that we can find a better system in the future.

Sources

Burton, John. “Institutional Values and Human Needs.” In Deviance Terrorism & War, by John Burton, 55-84. Australian National University Press, 1979.

Lynch, Dov. Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004.

McMahon, Colin. “Chicago Tribune.” Boston marathon bombing suspects born in Chechnya area. April 19, 2013. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/sns-boston-marathon-bombing-suspects-from-chechnya-20130419,0,2164959.story (accessed May 11, 2013).

Volkan, Vamik. Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.